A fresh line of experiments published in Political Psychology suggests that people often fail to notice when attitudes on social issues are shifting in both major parties, and that presenting these trends dynamically can foster a more hopeful view of cross-party cooperation. The research, led by Trystan Loustau, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience at Boston College, finds that recognising shared directionality in opinion change can nudge partisans toward warmer judgments of their opponents.
Descriptive social norms—perceptions of what others believe or do—have long been used to explain political hostility, and perceptions in politics are frequently distorted. For example, a study covered by PsyPost in 2021 indicated that both Democrats and Republicans overestimate how much the opposing party dislikes them, a misperception that can drive further polarisation.
Traditionally, researchers have relied on static norms, which describe a snapshot of current levels of support for an issue within a group. Dynamic norms, by contrast, describe how beliefs or behaviours are changing over time, and a 2017 study found that indicating a trend toward growth can persuade people to adopt new behaviours even when present support is modest.
The new project also grapples with how misperceptions about long-term shifts can shape political attitudes. A 2022 study suggested Americans often misjudge how public opinion has moved over decades, typically overestimating the degree of change, particularly in a liberal direction. Loustau and colleagues set out to test whether correcting these misperceptions about trends could soften partisan hostility, while noting that framing may matter: a 2021 paper argued that describing partisan divisions can make division seem normal and potentially deepen polarisation.
“A lot of research shows that Democrats and Republicans have distorted perceptions of one another, and that these misperceptions can make political divisions seem larger than they really are,” Loustau told PsyPost. “But most of that work focuses on a snapshot of the present: what Democrats or Republicans believe right now. We were interested in whether people also misperceive change: even when members of both parties are moving in the same direction on an issue, do people recognize that convergence?”
“That seemed especially important because the direction people think society is moving may shape how they imagine its future,” he added. “If you believe the two parties are becoming increasingly divided, you might respond very differently to political opponents than if you believe there are areas where they are gradually finding more common ground.”
In the first study, 368 Democrats and Republicans estimated current support and changes in support for 12 social issues on which support had actually risen in both parties. The researchers found that participants systematically underestimated attitude change. Only about half of the estimates accurately recognised that support for these issues was increasing, and they underestimated current levels by about 12 points for Democrats and 20 points for Republicans.
Misperceptions were especially pronounced when evaluating Republicans. Only about 25 percent of Democrats’ estimates and 44 percent of Republicans’ estimates regarding Republican attitude changes were accurate, compared with 77 percent and 66 percent accuracy for Democratic attitude changes. The authors note this finding contrasts with a 2022 study, where real increases in support for progressive positions were often missed, particularly among Republicans, suggesting people may expect Democrats but not Republicans to move left.
The researchers found a correlation between recognising these trends and warmer intergroup attitudes: for every additional 10 percent of estimates that correctly identified change in the opposing party, participants felt about 3 points warmer toward that party on a 0-to-100 scale. This association held even after accounting for accuracy about current support, which itself did not relate to warmth.
“Political disagreement is real, but our perceptions of it are not always accurate,” Loustau noted. “We may be particularly bad at noticing when attitudes are changing.”
To test whether correcting misperceptions could help, the team randomised 1,187 partisans to a dynamic norm condition, a static norm condition, or a control condition featuring apolitical topics. The dynamic norm message provided past and current levels of partisan support together with the percentage-point increases over time, while the static norm message offered only current support levels.
The results showed that those in the dynamic norm condition anticipated more future common ground between the parties than the control group. However, combining the current support levels with the trend did not produce broader positive changes in attitudes toward the outparty, such as warmth or a sense of belonging.
A third study refined the intervention using a new sample of 1,154 participants. In this iteration, the dynamic norm condition isolated the trend information by removing references to current levels of partisan support, focusing solely on how support had grown within each party over time. Participants were assigned to read the refined message, the original combined message from the second study, the static message, or the control material.
The refined message increased expected common ground and expected future belonging with the outparty. On a 0-to-100 scale, outparty warmth rose to about 32.5 for those readers, compared with roughly 25.9 in the control group, and participants evaluated members of the other party more positively. A recent review of 77 depolarisation interventions found an average gain of about 5.4 points in outparty warmth, making the refined message’s 6.6-point difference comparable to that average.
The refined message was the only version to outperform the control on all four measures tested. On warmth and positive evaluations, however, it did not statistically outperform either the original combined message or the static message, and the static message did raise warmth relative to control. There was no evidence that any version altered perceptions of overlap between the parties.
“What surprised me most was how much the way we presented the same information mattered,” Loustau said. “It was a useful reminder that more information is not necessarily better: emphasising how far apart the parties remain may overshadow evidence that they are moving in the same direction.”
“The broader takeaway is that focusing exclusively on today’s partisan divisions can obscure meaningful ways in which public opinion is changing,” he added.
The findings align with earlier PsyPost coverage from 2024, which reported that showing partisans how much their core personal values overlap increased perceived similarity, strengthened beliefs that compromise is possible, and fostered greater hope. That study focused on present-day overlap in values, whereas the current work examines shifts in opinion on specific issues over time.
As with all research, there are caveats. The sample was an online panel rather than nationally representative, and outcomes were measured only immediately after reading the messages, with no follow-up.
The study relied on real polling data for issues that were largely progressive in nature, so it is unclear whether the effects would hold for conservative policies or other contexts. Using real polling data also meant the researchers could not test larger shifts in opinion, and many of the actual changes presented were modest.
“The effects on attitudes toward the opposing party were small, and I think it is important to be clear about that,” Loustau noted. “A brief informational message is not going to eliminate partisan polarization. At the same time, polarisation is a large, persistent social problem, so even small changes produced by a relatively minimal intervention can be informative, particularly because the intervention consisted simply of changing which accurate information about public opinion people saw.”
“I would view the findings less as evidence for a single solution to polarisation and more as evidence that people’s expectations about where political groups are headed can influence how they think about those groups in the present,” he observed.
It is also possible that emphasising negative trajectories could have the opposite effect. Messages highlighting increasing disagreement or polarisation might inadvertently increase hostility. Future research could explore whether this kind of dynamic messaging works for other intergroup conflicts, such as those involving race or religion, and whether the observed changes in attitude persist over longer periods of time.
“Long term, I’m interested in what happens when we encourage people to think about political differences in a more future-oriented way,” Loustau said. “Rather than focusing only on how different we are right now, I want to understand what changes when people recognise both their own and others’ capacity to change. That shared capacity may itself be a form of common ground, opening space to imagine not just what society currently looks like, but what we want our relationships and world to look like in the future.”
The study, “Partisans misperceive and are influenced by dynamic norms,” was authored by Trystan Loustau, Ashley Fabrizio, Liane Young, Jordan Wylie, and Stylianos Syropoulos.
