Plans by Donald Trump’s administration to remove South Africa and Rwanda from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) have exposed the vulnerability of African economies that rely on trade preferences controlled by Washington.
The decision came just two months after the US president signed legislation extending AGOA until the end of 2028. Congress had given overwhelming support to the extension, but the administration announced on November 2 that the two countries would lose eligibility from January 1, 2027.
AGOA currently covers 33 sub-Saharan African countries and allows thousands of products to enter the US market duty-free. Introduced in 2000, it was intended to promote economic growth, strengthen trade and encourage political and economic reforms.
The programme initially supported more than 300,000 direct jobs across Africa and 1.3 million indirect jobs. Two-way goods trade between the US and sub-Saharan Africa reached 47.5 billion US dollars in 2023, including 9.7 billion dollars in imports under AGOA and the Generalised System of Preferences.
But the value of goods entering the US duty-free under the schemes fell from 7.9 billion dollars in 2024 to 5 billion dollars in 2025, according to a Congressional Research Service report. The share of US imports from sub-Saharan Africa benefiting from the preferences also fell from more than 80 per cent in 2008 to about 24.7 per cent in 2021, amid uncertainty over eligibility and repeated short-term renewals.
The benefits have been concentrated among a small number of countries. South Africa is the programme’s largest beneficiary, while many other eligible economies have struggled to make full use of the preferential access.
Because AGOA is administered unilaterally by the US rather than through a bilateral treaty, Washington can suspend or restore a country’s access based on its own assessments of market reforms, human rights and labour standards. Previous suspensions have had immediate consequences, including the loss of thousands of garment-sector jobs after Ethiopia was removed from the programme in 2022.
In the latest case, South Africa’s closer economic and political ties with China and Russia have placed it at odds with US interests. Washington has also accused the country of obstructing American trade and investment, while Mr Trump has made allegations of “white genocide” in South Africa.
Rwanda’s alleged support for the M23 rebel group in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has likewise brought it into conflict with US interests in a region regarded as important for critical minerals.
Loss of AGOA access can lead to tariff increases of 15 to 20 per cent on some products. The uncertainty created by short extensions and abrupt policy changes has left African exporters exposed to decisions made by successive US administrations.
AfCFTA seen as alternative to reliance on Washington
The instability has increased pressure for faster implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which aims to create a single market covering more than 1.3 billion people and a combined gross domestic product of more than 3.4 trillion dollars.
Trade between African countries currently accounts for only about 15 to 18 per cent of the continent’s total trade. AfCFTA seeks to remove tariffs on 90 per cent of tariff lines, helping to expand internal commerce and reduce the impact of sudden changes in access to Western markets.
The agreement is also intended to support regional value chains. Rather than exporting raw materials, countries could share production across borders, with goods processed and manufactured within Africa before being sold to consumers on the continent.
Several initiatives have been developed to support that ambition, including the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System, which enables cross-border transactions in African currencies and reduces reliance on foreign currencies such as the US dollar.
The African Union has also adopted protocols covering competition policy and digital trade. The AfCFTA Secretariat signed an agreement in August 2026 to modernise and digitise customs systems, while an adjustment fund requiring an estimated 8 billion to 10 billion dollars has been activated to help developing countries and small and medium-sized businesses adapt.
Further progress will depend on removing tariff and non-tariff barriers, aligning regulatory policies and investing in roads, railways and digital energy infrastructure. Building stronger regional manufacturing and innovation networks would reduce the continent’s exposure to the withdrawal of unilateral trade preferences.
