Morocco’s Justice and Development Party is attempting to rebuild after its dramatic electoral collapse, placing Abdelilah Benkirane’s return and a broader policy programme at the centre of its recovery.
The PJD won 107 of the 395 seats in Parliament in 2011, after protests demanding political reform, greater accountability and a more responsive government. Its then-leader, Benkirane, became head of government.
Five years later, the party increased its representation to 125 seats. But Benkirane spent months unable to form a governing coalition before King Mohammed VI ended his mandate in March 2017 and appointed Saadeddine Othmani in his place.
The PJD remained in government until the September 2021 election, when it was reduced to just 13 seats. It lost 112 representatives, while the National Rally of Independents won 102 seats and emerged as the largest party.
Can Benkirane revive the PJD?
Benkirane’s return has given the party one of Morocco’s most recognisable political figures, but it has also raised questions about whether its recovery depends too heavily on his personal appeal.
His long public career, media presence and direct style have helped create a political profile that can act as electoral capital. The challenge for the PJD is to convert that attention into renewed support for the organisation itself.
The party’s 2026 programme contains 467 measures covering identity and family, political and institutional reform, public services and social protection, the economy and employment, and foreign policy.
It promises greater transparency in public procurement, measures to address conflicts of interest and illicit enrichment, and improvements to public services. Housing, social protection, food, water and energy sovereignty also feature prominently.
Much of the programme focuses on practical concerns, including prices, employment, schools, hospitals and corruption.
Saad al-Sabahi, who works with the PJD’s regional secretariat in Casablanca-Settat, said the proposals had been developed through studies, consultation meetings and submissions made through an online platform.
“These commitments cover a range of sectors and areas affecting the lives of the Moroccan people,” he said, highlighting political participation, tackling corruption, public education, healthcare, employment and economic sovereignty.
“These commitments, among others, form the basis of the agreement between the party and voters. We will work to fulfil and implement them with integrity and competence,” he added.
Lessons from the 2021 defeat
The PJD says it has used the years since its defeat to reorganise internally and reassess its time in government.
“The party was able to overcome its crisis following its extraordinary and regular congresses, and after Secretary-General Abdelilah Benkirane took over the leadership,” al-Sabahi said. “The party also reorganised its internal affairs through communication and the renewal of its structures.”
The party’s own assessment has criticised some of its political and organisational decisions. It has also blamed unnamed actors for undermining democratic choice and alleged electoral corruption and disinformation.
Those claims are the PJD’s explanation for the result rather than independently established findings. The scale of the defeat nevertheless forced the party to confront how far its record in government had distanced it from parts of its previous support base.
Winning back younger voters is a particular concern. Imane Traifi, of the PJD Youth, said young people should be given lasting opportunities to participate in political life rather than being treated simply as voters during election campaigns.
“We are keen to ensure that young people move from being recipients to becoming participants, initiators and people who take on responsibility,” she said.
The limits facing a PJD government
The party’s return also raises a question beyond its programme: how much would it be able to change if it regained office?
During his time in government, Benkirane referred repeatedly to “ghosts and crocodiles” as a metaphor for powerful or hidden interests that he said had obstructed his administration.
The issue is particularly clear in the PJD’s opposition to Morocco’s normalisation with Israel. The party continues to support the Palestinian cause and its 2026 programme explicitly rejects normalisation.
Morocco restored diplomatic ties with Israel in 2020, while the PJD was in government and Othmani was head of government. The party opposed the move, while Othmani later defended it as a state decision and said Morocco’s support for the Palestinians remained unchanged.
The agreement was concluded in December 2020 as part of a United States-brokered deal that included Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
Since then, relations have developed further. On September 16, Morocco and Israel agreed to raise their diplomatic missions to embassy level and appoint ambassadors, alongside plans to expand air travel and advance economic and trade agreements.
The PJD reaffirmed its opposition to normalisation and cooperation with Israel the following day, describing its position as longstanding. The episode leaves open the question of whether the party now has a different understanding of the limits of government authority.
Morocco’s constitutional system gives the monarchy a central role in strategic state decisions. The king appoints the head of government from the party that comes first in the House of Representatives and chairs the Council of Ministers, where the broad direction of state policy is considered.
The PJD has said it wants change from within that system rather than a challenge to the monarchy. Benkirane has repeatedly reaffirmed his support for the monarchy while arguing that elected institutions should fulfil their role in governing and improving the country.
For the PJD, recovering from 2021 will therefore require more than regaining lost seats. It must demonstrate what it learned from a decade in government, what it can deliver and how it would avoid the political costs that accompanied its collapse.
Yassine Elachiri, a member of the PJD Youth National Bureau and the party’s National Council, said rebuilding trust with younger Moroccans would require sustained work rather than short-term campaigning.
“Earning the trust of a new generation of young people cannot be reduced to electoral mobilisation or short-term campaigns in the run-up to voting day,” he said. “Rather, it is a cumulative process built on sustained engagement, guidance, training and creating opportunities for young people to participate actively in public affairs.”
“Our goal is not simply to reach young people at the moment of an election, but to build a lasting relationship with them based on trust, training and active participation,” Elachiri said.
