A landmark set of international studies is challenging the idea that a single, broad “conspiracy mentality” sits at the heart of why people endorse multiple conspiracy theories. The research, published in the European Journal of Social Psychology, analyses almost 30,000 responses across 17 national samples in three separate studies and involves a cross-disciplinary team led by Arturo Bertero of the University of Milan, with Matt Williams, Federico Vegetti and Moreno Mancosu.
The work distinguishes between two ways of thinking about conspiratorial beliefs. Specific conspiracy beliefs refer to concrete claims that powerful actors are secretly behind major events, such as government orchestrations or alleged health cover-ups. By contrast, conspiracy mentality is a more general predisposition—a worldview in which secret plots and deceptive authorities are believed to manipulate world events, without reference to a particular incident or actor.
The genesis of the debate lies in a well-documented pattern: people who accept one conspiracy claim tend to accept others, even when the stories are unrelated or contradictory. Earlier research cited includes findings from a 2012 British study that linked beliefs about Princess Diana’s death to suspicions of murder, and a later follow-up that connected beliefs about cover-ups to broader distrust in authorities.
To test whether a general conspiracy mentality actually drives the array of specific beliefs, the researchers used network psychometrics—a statistical approach that maps how responses relate without assuming a single hidden cause. They tested whether a combined conspiracy mentality score would emerge as the central hub in a network of individual conspiracy beliefs, or whether the opposite would hold true.
In Study 1, data from the SUSPECTS project covered eight Western democracies—France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States—with quota-based online samples of about 2,500 adults per country. Participants answered five general conspiracy mentality items and eight specific, non-political conspiracy claims designed to be comparable across borders, including theories about chemtrails and alleged government poisoning.
Across all eight countries, the analyses confirmed that general conspiracy mentality and specific conspiracy beliefs formed two distinct dimensions. However, the mentality-centered network model failed in every country except France, where the result was inconclusive. In seven of the eight nations, the general mentality score was among the least central nodes in the network, and it was second-least central in France.
When the researchers inverted the approach and tested a belief-centered network in Study 1, the combined score for specific conspiracy beliefs showed markedly strong connections in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. It surpassed every mentality item only in France, with results in the remaining seven countries remaining inconclusive, though none rejected the belief-centered model outright.
To broaden the test, Studies 2 and 3 used different questionnaires and countries. Study 2 reanalysed May 2021 public survey data from a sample of 2,020 American adults, examining four general conspiracy mentality items and six prominent American-specific conspiracy theories, including allegations around the Epstein case and the influence of figures such as George Soros or Bill Gates.
In Study 2, the joint results leaned toward the mentality-centered account. The general mentality score exhibited the highest connection strength within the American network, and it was reliably more connected than three of the six belief items, with no single belief item more connected than any mentality item. The combined beliefs score was the second-least connected node in the reverse network, though the statistical tests remained inconclusive for some items.
Study 3 then turned to the Comparative Conspiracy Research Survey, analysing responses from 7,867 participants across Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Lebanon, Morocco, South Africa and the United States collected in late 2022 and early 2023. Respondents answered five general conspiracy mentality items on a 0-to-10 scale and four country-specific conspiracy beliefs on a 0-to-4 scale, blending locally salient narratives with global claims.
In Study 3, the separation between general mentality and specific beliefs held up in Australia, Brazil, Germany, Lebanon, Morocco and South Africa, but Canada and the United States split into three smaller clusters. When examining hub status, the mentality-centered hypothesis was falsified in six countries and inconclusive in Morocco and the United States. The belief-centered hypothesis was falsified in all eight countries.
The researchers conducted additional analyses to ensure the results were not artefacts of differing item counts. By repeatedly dropping questions to equalise the number of items in the mentality and beliefs scales, they re-estimated the networks and found results broadly consistent with the original patterns: Study 1 tended to place beliefs at the center, Study 2 placed mentality at the centre, and Study 3 produced mixed results across countries. They also confirmed the findings with an alternative network-estimation method.
Concluding, Bertero emphasised that there is no single pattern linking general conspiracy mentality with specific beliefs. “So there is no single pattern linking the two,” he said, adding that “when you read a study on conspiracy theories, keep in mind that its results depend in part on how beliefs and conspiracy mentality were measured.”
Two theoretical readings emerge from the group’s interpretation. One is that highly salient, context-bound conspiracy theories may align closely with the generalized suspicions captured by a particular mentality scale, while a broader cross-national set of theories preserves links that a generic mentality measure does not absorb. The other reading suggests that a web of specific beliefs can be partly self-sustaining and not reducible to a single overarching mindset. The authors stress that the results do not justify abandoning conspiracy mentality measures; rather, the choice of measurement should reflect the research question—general scales for cross-country comparisons, or item-based measures for inquiries into particular events.
The researchers caution that all three studies rely on cross-sectional surveys, so the maps show associations rather than developmental trajectories. A central limitation is that a snapshot cannot reveal which beliefs shape others or vice versa over time. “A snapshot cannot show what comes first, so this paper does not settle the direction,” said Bertero, who urged future work with panel data to track how networks evolve and how changes in one area might influence another.
Bertero also noted the broader measurement challenge for specific beliefs highlighted by Roland Imhoff, a co-author on the 2022 review. “Conspiracy mentality now has many validated scales. Specific beliefs have received less attention because, as Roland Imhoff has rightly noted, they are much harder to measure: each item carries its own content, and which theories matter changes from one country and one moment to the next.”
Reflecting on the collaboration, Bertero praised the interdisciplinary approach. “Work like this happens when scientists from different disciplines meet,” he said. “Our mixed backgrounds let us approach a contested question in a new way.”
The study, titled “Searching for the Core of Conspiracy Belief Systems: The Relationship Between Specific Beliefs and Generic Mentality,” is attributed to Arturo Bertero, Matt Williams, Federico Vegetti and Moreno Mancosu. The research represents a cautious step toward understanding how conspiracy beliefs are structured across cultures and questions the universality of a single driving mentality.
