A parliamentary report into the deadly MRH-90 Taipan crash near Lindeman Island has identified a combination of dangerous software, an unreliable aircraft and severe crew fatigue as contributing factors in the deaths of four Australian soldiers.
Bushman 83 was flying low over the Whitsundays during a simulated night extraction mission in 2023 when it crashed. Captain Danniel Lyon, Lieutenant Maxwell Nugent, Warrant Officer Class Two Joseph Laycock and Corporal Alexander Naggs were killed.
The incident remains the only fatality involving Exercise Talisman Sabre in its 21-year history.
‘Unacceptable risk’ software
The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee found that the crew were using night-vision equipment while flying in formation with three other Taipans.
The pilots’ actions were not criticised. The report said: “The actions of the crew of Bushman 83 have never been called into question.”
However, the aircraft was fitted with helmet-display software known as HMSD v5.10, despite a safety assessment by the Army Aviation Test and Evaluation Section finding it posed an “unacceptable risk”.
The assessment warned that, when pilots turned their heads while wearing the updated helmet, the display could confuse tilt and angle information. In poor visibility, this could create false visual cues, cause severe disorientation and result in a fatal crash.
Army leadership nevertheless authorised the software for operational use because it had met a German standard.
Retired Majors David Lamb and Ian Wilson told the committee that the conditions would have tested even the most capable pilot. The report quoted them as saying the environment “would challenge even the best pilot on the planet to recover, if they were put in the same circumstances”.
Fatigue and Army Aviation culture
The federal safety agency concluded that Defence had failed to meet its workplace health and safety obligations, including in its management of aircrew fatigue during the exercise.
The report said the combination of night flying, low-level operations and formation flying created conditions in which the known risks associated with HMSD v5.10 could arise.
Evidence from the families of the dead also raised concerns about the crew’s rest arrangements. Sarah Loft, the partner of Corporal Naggs, said she was surprised to learn that he was sleeping on a stretcher in a large tent rather than in a hotel.
She said he had been flying at night and sleeping during the day, but struggled with the heat and with switching to a night-time routine within a single day. He told her it would be “tricky to stay awake”, with “loads of coffee” the answer.
Chadine Whyte, Lieutenant Nugent’s partner, said he had been working night shifts for about two weeks while sleeping on a stretcher in miserable weather.
The committee said a “can do” culture within Army Aviation had weakened safety protections. It heard that concerns about the MRH-90 and its equipment had been overlooked, downgraded or ignored, while compliance work by the Army Aviation Test and Evaluation Section was viewed by some as obstructive rather than essential.
It said the safety culture appeared more mature in the Air Force and Navy than in Army Aviation.
Aircraft history and recommendations
The report also criticised the history of the MRH-90 programme. The helicopters were selected in 2004 over the Army’s preferred S-70M Black Hawk, despite what the committee described as a long record of reported problems.
Although the aircraft entered service on schedule in December 2007, they were accepted in a form that did not comply with the contracted specifications.
A 2021 review estimated that the total cost of the programme would reach 15 billion Australian dollars by the time the helicopters were due to be withdrawn from service in 2037, with most of the expenditure going towards maintenance.
Following the crash, the MRH-90s were removed from service, dismantled and scrapped rather than sold or donated. Defence Minister Richard Marles said there were no interested buyers and that the value of the airframes lay in their spare parts.
The committee made seven recommendations, including a review of Army Aviation’s fatigue-risk policies and procedures to ensure compliance with Defence aviation safety regulations.
