A major US study published in the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion finds that a household’s income shapes how believers interpret the Bible’s teachings on poverty and charity. The research shows that highly religious individuals at opposite ends of the income spectrum tend to reach markedly different conclusions: low‑income believers view biblical charity as a call for societal transformation, while affluent believers see it as a matter of individual philanthropy.
Sociologists have long debated how religion relates to economic inequality. One influential line of thought, rooted in Karl Marx, argues religion acts as an opiate that pacifies the less well off. By normalising the current economic order, religious ideas supposedly dull the motivation to challenge inequality. Other scholars suggest religion functions as a bond within groups, shaping beliefs to reflect a group’s interests rather than universally endorsing the status quo.
University of Oklahoma sociologist Samuel L. Perry set out to test these competing theories. He sought to discover whether high levels of religious commitment are linked to justifying the current economic system regardless of wealth, or whether religiosity amplifies different biblical interpretations depending on how much money a person earns.
The analysis drew on data from the 2022 Public Religion Research Institute and Brookings Christian Nationalism Survey, providing a nationally representative sample of 5,701 adults. Respondents were asked what they think Jesus and the prophets mainly meant by caring for the poor in the Bible.
Participants were presented with two interpretations. The first suggested that biblical teachings on the poor refer primarily to acts of charitable giving by individuals. The second proposed that these teachings imply an obligation to create a more just society, a view scholars often call structural transformation.
Two measures of religious commitment were used. A private dimension captured how often respondents attended religious services, while a public and ideological dimension measured adherence to Christian nationalism, an ideology seeking to fuse Christian identity with American civic life and government policy.
Respondents were grouped by annual household income: under $50,000, between $50,000 and $99,999, and $100,000 or more. The statistical models controlled for a broad range of factors, including political ideology, party affiliation, age, race, gender, educational attainment, religious denomination and geographic region.
The control variables behaved as expected: self‑identified conservatives and Republicans were less likely to favour the structural‑transformation reading, while atheists, non‑evangelical Protestants and more highly educated individuals were more likely to affirm it.
Across income groups, the study revealed distinct patterns. Among the lowest income Americans, greater religious commitment correlated with a higher likelihood of choosing the structural‑transformation interpretation. Highly religious individuals in this bracket were more inclined to believe the Bible requires the creation of a just society.
The opposite pattern emerged among the highest income group. For those earning $100,000 or more, high levels of church attendance and strong Christian nationalism were associated with the individualized charity interpretation, i.e., that helping the poor is primarily a matter of personal generosity.
Middle‑income earners fell somewhere in between, though they trended toward the individualized interpretation as Christian nationalism rose. Overall, the results showed a widening divide across income groups that intensified with greater religious devotion.
The divergence was sharpest among the most devout participants. Among those who rarely attended services or scored low on Christian nationalism, income did not predict views on biblical charity. It was only among highly religious respondents that economic position aligned with a particular theological reading.
Author Perry suggests the findings support the in‑group cohesion theory over the idea of religion as an opiate. Rather than dulling political impulse among lower‑income groups, religion appears to amplify the economic interests of the class to which a person belongs, favouring wealthier believers’ emphasis on individual giving and lower‑income believers’ emphasis on structural fairness.
Several methodological caveats accompany the results. The data are cross‑sectional, capturing a single point in time, so they cannot definitively prove causation between income, religiosity and biblical interpretation. It remains possible, though deemed less plausible by the author, that theological views might influence economics or church attendance.
Additionally, income was used as a proxy for social class, a simplification of a more nuanced social position that also includes education, occupation and personal perception of status. Future work could incorporate broader measures of class to test whether the same patterns persist.
The study, titled Opiate or In-Group Amphetamine? Religion, Economic Position, and the Bible’s Teaching on Charity, was authored by Samuel L. Perry.
