Renewed US attacks on Iran could draw the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf energy infrastructure and several regional fronts into a wider conflict, as Tehran says seven oil tankers have caught fire or been damaged in and around the vital waterway.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has warned that further American strikes would trigger a broader response. Analysts consider an attack before the US midterm elections on November 3 unlikely, but escalating threats have raised fears that hostilities could resume.
The situation is markedly different from February 28, when the United States and Israel first launched strikes on Iran. At that point, the Strait of Hormuz was not central to the confrontation and negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme were still under way.
Since then, the conflict has spread geographically, imposed heavy costs on both sides and created a global energy crisis. The key question now is how far the war has shifted from the circumstances that existed before the first strikes.
Strait of Hormuz becomes central to the Iran conflict
The Gulf’s waterways and energy facilities have emerged as major battlegrounds. Iran’s attacks on US military assets and civilian infrastructure have also exposed neighbouring Gulf states to a war they had sought to avoid.
Urban Coningham, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, said negotiations had previously focused on Iran’s regional allies and nuclear programme. “The Strait of Hormuz and attacks on the Gulf have now become central points of contention,” he said.
The strait, between Iran and Oman, had been open to international shipping before the war. Iran now has the ability to impose costs well beyond its borders by threatening and attacking vessels, while the US maintains a blockade of Iranian ports.
Shipping has been severely disrupted and supplies of oil and gas have fallen. Reports that the Pentagon and US National Security Council underestimated Iran’s willingness to restrict passage through the strait were rejected by Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, who said the military had prepared for that possibility.
The waterways are not the only new front. Fighting between Yemen’s Saudi-backed internationally recognised government and the Iran-backed Houthis has resumed, with missile and drone attacks targeting Saudi airports and oil infrastructure.
That has put the Bab al-Mandeb strait, linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, under renewed focus. Threats to Saudi-linked shipping could compound disruption in Hormuz and make it more difficult to move Gulf exports through alternative routes.
Regional allies pull Lebanon and Yemen deeper into the war
The original US-Israeli campaign also sought to weaken Iran’s regional allies, including Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as prevent Tehran-backed groups from attacking American forces and destabilising the region.
Hamas has been severely weakened as Israel continues its attacks in Gaza. More than 1,400 Palestinians have been killed since a US-backed ceasefire was announced in October last year, according to the figures in the source material.
Lebanon entered the conflict in early March after Hezbollah retaliated against northern Israel following the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the first US-Israeli air strikes.
Israel subsequently bombed sites in southern Lebanon and Beirut suburbs it regarded as Hezbollah strongholds, at one point occupying about a fifth of the country and displacing more than one million people. Israeli forces continue to hold significant territory along Lebanon’s southern border.
Political pressure grows on leaders in Washington and Tehran
Iran’s leadership remains concerned about unrest and its own survival, but faces no equivalent electoral test to the one confronting Donald Trump’s Republican Party less than two weeks before the US midterms.
Before the February strikes, Iran was already dealing with public anger after a deadly January crackdown on protests driven by high inflation and the collapse in the value of its currency.
The attacks killed Khamenei, who had ruled since 1989, and security chief Ali Larijani, but failed to bring down the Islamic Republic. Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, succeeded him, while the influence of the IRGC has strengthened the position of hardliners.
Mr Coningham cautioned that the absence of demonstrations during wartime should not be taken as evidence of support for the government. “While the conflict had produced a rallying effect around resistance to foreign attacks, that did not mean Iran had emerged stronger,” he said.
Mr Trump, meanwhile, faces mounting domestic pressure. His approval rating fell from 40 per cent in a Reuters/Ipsos poll recorded days before the war to 31 per cent in a survey released on Monday, the lowest recorded by the pollster across either of his presidential terms.
High petrol prices and the unpopularity of the war among Americans have added to the political risks facing the president before the election.
Iran and the US face rising economic and military costs
Iran’s economy was already weakened by sanctions and frozen overseas assets. The war has intensified the strain through military action, further sanctions and the US naval blockade.
The Iranian government estimated in April that direct and indirect damage from the US-Israeli attacks had reached 270 billion dollars. In late August, Washington launched Operation Economic Outcast to isolate Iran from international trade by penalising those doing business with it.
Iran’s official figures showed gross domestic product contracting by 10.1 per cent year on year between March 21 and June 20. Energy exports have been sharply curtailed and the rial has fallen heavily in value.
The United States has also paid a substantial price. The Congressional Budget Office estimated in September that the conflict had cost the Department of Defense 38 billion dollars by August 1, with continuing operations expected to cost between two billion and three billion dollars a month, depending on the intensity of fighting.
US government debt passed 40 trillion dollars in August, two years earlier than previously expected, as the additional costs of the war mounted.
American military strength has enabled strikes deep inside Iran, but has not removed the country’s political system or ended its ability to retaliate against US assets and energy infrastructure in neighbouring states.
Mr Coningham described Washington’s difficulty as “translating military superiority into strategic results”. He said troop redeployments could amount partly to military posturing, while also representing a shift away from earlier efforts to reduce the US presence in parts of the region.
US media reports have pointed to a severe shortage of defensive weapons in the Middle East, after expensive missiles were used against large numbers of cheaper Iranian drones. The USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit were expected to reach the region by the end of November, bringing about 10,000 personnel and expanding Mr Trump’s military options.
Iran’s navy has been badly damaged, forcing greater reliance on smaller vessels, including speedboats used in recent attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. Its forces can also target ships from ground positions along the coast and use rockets to place sea mines in the waterway.
Mr Coningham said the IRGC had demonstrated an ability to wage asymmetric warfare, using mass-produced drones and decentralised structures to keep operating despite disrupted communications and the loss of senior commanders.
Global energy crisis adds to pressure for renewed action
The prospect of a global energy crisis was not apparent in February, but disruptions to Gulf supplies and fears of further escalation have since driven oil prices sharply higher.
Brent crude settled at 72.48 dollars a barrel on February 27, the day before the war began. It reached 126.41 dollars on April 30, its highest level in four years, and stood at 114.47 dollars in early trading on Friday.
The impact extends beyond crude oil. Damage to fuel production in the Middle East, combined with sanctions on Russian supplies, has tightened diesel markets, while global liquefied natural gas supplies have also been heavily affected.
The International Energy Agency has warned that supply constraints could continue well into 2027. Diesel prices in the US have doubled, creating particular pressure for farmers and businesses that depend on the fuel for production and transport.
Alternative ports, pipelines and ship-to-ship transfers have allowed Gulf producers to restore some exports, but at higher logistical cost and with continued exposure to attack.
Restoring shipping through the region’s vital waterways has therefore become a central objective, should the United States and Iran return to open hostilities.
