China’s growing role in the Gulf is being driven by trade, technology and investment rather than an attempt to replace the United States as the region’s main military power.
Qatar’s Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, recently travelled to China, following visits by senior officials from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia earlier this year. The meetings reflect Beijing’s expanding diplomatic and economic presence in a region traditionally aligned with Washington.
China’s wider diplomatic calendar has also included visits to Beijing by prominent leaders from the US, Russia, the UK, Canada, Spain, South Korea, Pakistan and Jordan.
China’s growing role in the Gulf
The US remains the Gulf’s most important external military partner, with defence agreements, intelligence links, weapons systems, naval capabilities and military forces continuing to underpin regional security.
But measuring Chinese influence solely against America’s military reach risks missing the nature of Beijing’s strategy. China has shown little interest in assuming the political, financial and military burden of becoming the Gulf’s security guarantor.
For decades, US naval power has helped protect the maritime routes used to carry Gulf energy to Asian markets. That security has also enabled Chinese companies to trade, invest, build infrastructure and buy energy without having to provide the wider security system themselves.
Instead, China has focused on areas where it can develop long-term economic leverage. State-owned Chinese companies hold interests in key Gulf infrastructure, including ports, while businesses from the country are becoming more closely involved in renewable energy, telecommunications, manufacturing, logistics, electric vehicles and digital infrastructure.
COSCO Shipping Ports, for example, holds a controlling stake in the joint venture operating the CSP Abu Dhabi Terminal at Khalifa Port in the UAE.
As financing, contracts, supply chains and technology networks become more closely connected, removing that presence could carry significant economic costs. Military deployments can be reduced, but interests in ports, factories, telecommunications systems and industrial networks are more difficult to unwind.
Beijing’s approach does not require Gulf governments to become politically aligned with China. It depends instead on making an openly hostile position towards China economically costly.
Gulf states pursue strategic autonomy
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are seeking close security ties with the US while also pursuing Chinese markets, manufacturing capacity, investment and access to Asian economic networks.
The strategy is intended to limit dependence on either power. Diversification has become a form of risk management as Gulf states prepare for a more multipolar international system in which American influence remains important but is no longer the sole source of economic, political and technological weight.
The disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and damage to US bases across the Gulf, including Al Udeid in Qatar, have demonstrated the vulnerabilities created by relying too heavily on one security provider, market, shipping route, technology system or source of capital.
The Gulf states are also trying to reduce their reliance on hydrocarbons. Artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, renewable energy and logistics are becoming central to their economic plans.
Saudi Arabia’s HUMAIN and the UAE’s G42 represent ambitions to build national AI industries, which require advanced chips, data centres, energy, computing infrastructure, capital and skilled workers. Gulf governments are therefore seeking international partners able to provide the technology, financing and industrial links needed for that transformation.
US influence faces a broader test
The changing balance means Washington may need to assess influence by more than the number of bases it operates in the region. The more important question could be how difficult it is for a power to be removed from the Gulf’s wider economic and strategic system.
The US remains deeply embedded through defence relationships, intelligence co-operation, financial institutions, universities, technology companies and diplomatic partnerships. China is building a different kind of integration based on trade, infrastructure, investment and technology.
Washington does not need to force Gulf governments to choose between the two powers in every sector. However, safeguards remain necessary in areas including advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, telecommunications, sensitive data and dual-use technologies.
The stronger response, the analysis argues, would be competition: offering advanced technology, credible financing and deeper industrial partnerships as Gulf states reshape their economies. Security guarantees remain essential, but they no longer ensure American primacy across every part of the region.
